



Australian Government

National Emergency Management Agency

Planning, preparing for and communicating sensitive national risks – Exotic Animal Disease Preparedness

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DISASTER INTENSITY AND CONSEQUENCES

The relationship between consequence, intensity, and the limitation of risk treatment effectiveness that close down spaces for effective leadership and decision-making




Diagram adapted from M Crosweller

Crosweller M, Tschakert P. Climate change and disasters: The ethics of leadership.



PREPAREDNESS

Trigger Points of Concern

- Outbreak detected in Australia
- Outbreak detected in another neighbouring country (e.g. PNG)
- Concurrent domestic disaster that may impact capability and capacity
- Concurrent overseas disaster that may call upon already stretched domestic capability and capacity
- Bioterrorism involving FMD or LSD anywhere in the world

Preparedness Initiatives

- National Cabinet and MP's have been briefed
- Joint Interagency Taskforce established
- National scenario discussions held (Northern and Southern)
- Financial support provided (domestic and international)
- Revised AUSVETPLAN Response Strategy for LSD released
- Animal Health Australia Workshops (Government and Industry)
- National Coordination Mechanism meetings convened
- Input non-biosecurity impacts into WoG Talking Points (DAFF Lead)
- Whole of Government planning initiated

Preparedness Actions






MONITOR



PLAN



EXECUTE



Planning Assumptions

- The biosecurity system is adequately resourced (has capability) but lacks capacity and requires further testing to manage the risk of FMD/LSD outbreaks in Australia
- Australian and jurisdictional governments have plans and resources in place and will enact them following an FMD or LSD incursion
- All levels of government and industry will continue to cooperate and resolve issues as they arise
- An outbreak on two or three infected premises, it would take 2-6 months of emergency activity before mitigation strategies would be put in place and take years to recover livestock numbers
- Any decision to vaccinate will be considered carefully in context of its consequences
- There will be years of financial and social support for affected communities following an incursion

Big Questions

- What are the synergies, risks or gaps across biosecurity and emergency management sectors and legislation?
- How quickly can response arrangements be enacted, mobilised and deployed?
- Are there existing intelligence or information management systems used in a biosecurity context?
- What are the workforce augmentation options and surge arrangements available to combat any outbreak of FMD/LSD in Australia?
- What are the non-biosecurity impacts of a FMD or LSD outbreak?

Preparedness

Mission

That all governments, affected industries and communities enhance their preparedness for a FMD and LSD incursion in order to mitigate the consequences of an FMD or LSD.

Incident Priorities

1. Maintain and enforce biosecurity controls and prevent entry of infectious agents and reduce livestock vulnerability
2. Protect livelihoods and economic stability
3. Protect industries and sectors through education of FMD and LSD risks
4. Provide timely and accurate information and warnings
5. Maintain and enhance relationships with domestic and international stakeholders
6. Ensure that animal welfare principles are upheld

Response Actions


Coordination and Governance

Movement Control

Tracing, Surveillance and Intelligence

Vaccination

Destruction, Disposal and Decontamination



CSIRO Data captured from 2014 to 2018

Lines of Effort

1. Maintain a robust biosecurity system capable of managing risks associated with any FMD or LSD incursion
2. Protect essential services, supply chains, and the economy
3. Provide options on financial funding, programs or grants to support any impacted sectors, industries or communities
4. Direct support to mitigate risks or augment the response and recovery to any major outbreak of FMD or LSD
5. Provide national plans, planning, and coordination and governance functions to support any major outbreak of FMD or LSD
6. Ensure public information communication is coordinated and timely.

Threat Effects (Assumes Incursion)

Most Likely

- Multi-jurisdictional outbreak in Southern Australia
- Initial 72hr national livestock "Stand Still" declared
- Infections detected in feral animal population
- Exports will cease initially, domestic consumption will be reduced
- Supply chains will be disrupted for multiple reasons (e.g. COVID, severe weather, etc.)
- COVID and natural disaster fatigue across government, industry and the community
- Protests and trespass from issue motivated groups
- Significant mental health issues within communities

Most Dangerous

- Multi-jurisdictional outbreak across Australia, undetected for some time
- Concurrent domestic natural disaster
- Initial 72hr national livestock "Stand Still" declared
- Infections detected in multiple/widespread feral animal populations
- Exports will cease for an extended period, enduring loss of markets, domestic consumption will be reduced
- Supply chains severely disrupted
- COVID and natural disaster fatigue across government, industry and the community
- ADF assets prioritised elsewhere
- Protests and trespass from issue motivated groups
- Significant mental health issues within communities

End state

That Australia is prepared for an FMD or LSD outbreak and ready to mount an effective response coordinated between the Commonwealth, jurisdictions and industry setting the conditions for a return to normal agricultural and trade conditions and public confidence in Australia's biosecurity system has been restored

National crisis communications can be strengthened through the creation of a national strategy

Finding

The Commonwealth, states/territories and industry have established communications frameworks and pre-prepared messages to be deployed during a biosecurity incident. National Biosecurity Communication and Engagement Network (NBCEN) has commenced work on national communications and engagement plans. These communications frameworks and the NBCEN have been proven effective for smaller scale incidents. The speed and scale of a response to an EAD, and lessons learned from COVID and recent fire and flood disasters, warrant a review of these arrangements.

Recommendation 3

Building upon the work of NBCEN, that Government consider engaging a crisis communications consultancy to accelerate the development of a national crisis communications strategy and 'playbook' to set out strategies, decision-making frameworks and pre-prepared content for initial actions across key time horizons (one hour, six hours, twelve hours, twenty-four hours, three days and seven days).

Action	Description
3.1	Develop a crisis communications 'playbook' to set out strategies and pre-prepared content for initial actions across key horizons (1hr, 6hrs, 12hrs, 24hrs, 3 days, 7 days). This strategy should include public messaging and talking points around vaccination, destruction and disposal plans, in order to educate wider populace and media concerning these potentially sensitive, yet public, actions.
3.2	Test the ability to mobilise the national crisis communications capability through an exercise activity (by November 2022).
3.3	Collaborate with relevant industry participants including retailers, regarding agreed messaging from Food Standards Australia New Zealand (FSANZ), to allow them to incorporate these into their own communications strategies.
3.4	Ensure that FSANZ have detailed and specific messaging on packaged meat and dairy products about food safety related to FMD and LSD.



Questions?